Send us your own comments about this object.

Title:	RIFLE/MUSKET -  U.S. RIFLE-MUSKET MODEL 1861 PERCUSSION .58
Maker/Manufacturer:	SPRINGFIELD ARMORY
Date of Manufacture:	1862
Eminent Figure:
Catalog Number:	SPAR 500
Measurements:	OL:142.2C 56" BL:101.6C 40"

Object Description:

U.S. RIFLE-MUSKET MODEL 1861 PERCUSSION .58
Manufactured by Springfield Armory, Springfield, Ma. in 1862 - Standard Model 1861 percussion rifle-musket. The bright finish lock plate is flat, bevelled and inletted into the stock to bevel height, and is about 5-3/8 inches long by 1-1/4 inches wide. Oil finish walnut stock is 52-1/2 inches long. Barrel is 40 inches long, finished bright and rifled with 3 grooves, making one turn in 6 feet. All furniture is iron, polished bright, with three flat bands held by band springs seated in front of the bands. The upper sling swivel is riveted to the middle band; the lower swivel to the front of the triggerguard bow. The bright, swelled end, cup-tipped ramrod has a channeled swell near the end of the fore-cap, to retain the ramrod in the stock. Weapon was test fired but never issued. This is one of 645 retained in arms rack popularly referred to as "Organ." Excellent condition. Approximately 265,129 Model 1861 rifle muskets were produced at the Springfield Armory between January 1, 1861 and December 31, 1863.

Markings:
Lock: Eagle motif/U.S./SPRINGFIELD forward of hammer. Rear of hammer: 1862.
Barrel: V/P/Eaglehead.
Buttplate: US.


Notes: "THE CIVIL WAR COMES TO SPRINGFIELD - The Civil War was a period of massive diffusion of 'armory practice' throughout the northern economy, as well as an economic stimulus to the buildup of industrial capacity and capital in the North. If there was still any question regarding the manufacturing techniques for precision componentry prior to the Civil War, by its end both the machinery and the knowledge were in place throughout the northern economy. The Armory's machinery patterns, carefully boxed, were sent by train throughout the North, wherever a call was made for their use. The use of these patterns was so widespread that the armory began assessing standardized charges of one-half cent per pound of castings made, to compensate for wear and tear.
Virtually every firm with any manufacturing capacity was mobilized for the wartime effort; many new firms rose to the opportunity of widespread contracts. Foundries made artillery pieces and machinery castings; clothiers sewed uniforms and blankets, harnessmakers made harness and saddles. And much of the North's metalworking industry engaged to make rifled muskets, accoutrements and parts. It would be difficult to overstate the importance of wartime contracting in diffusing these new technologies in the North. Twenty-three firms delivered completed arms; in turn hundreds of firms contracted to supply component parts, either for these contractors or the Armory.
Technical assistance with meeting specifications was broadly offered by Springfield Armory. Contractors sent foremen to the Armory to view manufacturing operations there, or copy the Armory's machine drawings. At least three contractors sent teams into the Armory to make gauges. Some were offered loans of tools, machinery and skilled workmen. And all were faced with the new experience of Army Ordnance inspectors arriving with boxes of precision gauges to carefully examine the contract pieces.
Springfield's success hinged critically on its interchangeable production. In effect, the Armory was able to expand its shop space virtually at will, by outsourcing component parts to other northern shops. If the Armory network int he 1820s and 30s comprised an integrated industrial district, the Civil War network of contractors, machinery builders and parts suppliers carried that integration to a far larger scale. Although Ordnance Department and Springfield Armory officials had advocated parts subcontracting (as opposed to having contractors build complete weapons) since the days of Roswell Lee, the Civil War offered the first feasible opportunity. Interchangeable production had finally come of age, and the Armory was able to successfully subcontract with hundreds of suppliers for various component parts. So long as those parts were fabricated to fit the gauges, they could be made anywhere, and shipped to Springfield for final assembly.
ThThe Springfield Armory had been producing small arms on a leisurely peacetime schedule since the close of the War of 1812; the Mexican War was the only real exception, and a brief one. The new production methods had never been put to the stress of war, nor had the Armory produced more than 23,000 arms per year. The armory faced the very real challenge of expanding its output to meet the new wartime demands for arms. By any criteria, the Armory was wildly successful. By 1864, the armory had expanded its annual production to 276,200 arms, a twenty-three-fold increase over its typical antebellum production figures of 12,000 arms. Over the course of the war, Springfield would furnish over 800,000 interchangeable rifled muskets to Union troops. By the way of contract, the twenty-three private firms producing complete arms on contract together supplied 643,439 stands of arms.
The Armory was able to achieve these production figures with minimal physical expansion to its facilities. Additional steam engines were put in place both on Armory Hill and at the water shops; the latter to enable reliable power in low water conditions, the former to enable some rationalization of the flow of semifinished materials. Heavy forging and barrel rolling were continued at the water shops, while stocking and milling operations, plus barrel turning, rifling and polishing, were centralized with assembly and inspection on Armory Hill.
To be sure, the one-mile separation between its major production facilities was a source of some inconvenience; eight teams were employed on the grounds, transporting materials between the two shops. The route between these facilities, Walnut Street, became such a major thoroughfare for workers and materials during the Civil War, that Superintendent A.B. Dyer and other citizens petitioned the Mayor of Springfield to install gas lights; when the city set aside the petition without action, Dyer asked permission to light the street himself at the expense of the government. Armory officials also looked into establishing a telegraphic link between the two sites. But the Hill Shops, in particular, benefited from the centralization of finishing operations there. Combined with its newfound ability to subcontract for either rough or finished parts, by 1863, the Armory was able to dramatically increase its production numbers.
Modern fascination with mid-nineteenth century developments in breechloading arms had led a number of critics, most recently William H. Hallahan, to criticize the Ordnance Department for its reluctance to adopt more modern weapons for the Civil War. Hallahan argues that the Ordnance Department's failure to adopt modern breechloaders, or repeating rifles such as the Spencer or Henry, unnecessarily increased the casualty lists of the Civil War, and put northern troops at risk. Both weapons saw service in state militias, and both were purchased in small numbers by the Ordnance Department. These critics ignore both the experience of armory officials and the inflexibility of new production systems.
Developmental work on metallic cartridges was in its infancy during the period; modern centerfire cartridges had not been developed, and the cartridges of the period were notoriously unreliable. Production tolerances were sloppy; misshapen or malformed cartridges were likely to jam or burst. A Henry rifle submitted to the Armory in early 1864 had misfired one of these cartridges the first time the trigger was pulled; the resultiProduction of interchangeable weapons also required heavy investment in special-purpose tools. Historically, the adoption of a new model musket meant the complete redesign of tooling, the making of hundreds of precision jigs and fixtures and the crafting of complex sets of precision guages. Further, in two previous changeovers ot new model weapons, in 1842 and 1855, the armory's production numbers fell dramatically for three years after the changeover. For instance, the changeover to the Model 1855 rifled musket resulted in production figures of only 2,721 weapons for the year of 1856 and 5,031 in 1857; by 1858 production returned to 11,198. Chief of Ordnance James Ripley, ex-superintendent of the armory from 1841 to 1855, knew this reality all too well to risk it.
This experience foreshadows Henry Ford's changeover from the venerable Model T to the new Model A. Ford had built an entire plant of single-purpose machine tools to produce the Model T in quantity; virtually every piece of machinery in the plant was scrapped, as it was not adaptable to produce the new car. Although the last Model T rolled off the production lines on May 26, 1927, the first public showing of the new Model A did not come until December 1st - a six-month shutdown - and further production was slow by Ford standards. By early October, 1828, the company was producing only 5,500 cars a day, compared with the maximum Model T production of 8,000 a day. Any such reduction would have been fatal for the Union army.
The result was the continued use of the muzzle-loading rifled musket. The rifled musket of the Civil War was a product of the Ordnance Department's commitment to controlled scientific testing. Extensive experiments in ballistics, first at Harpers Ferry and finalized at Springfield Armory, led to the adoption of the new rifled musket. Model 1855. These experiments were, not surprisingly, inspired by the French army's development of new rifled arms firing conical projectiles.
The French Army, through a course of scientific testing in ballistics, had developed the 'rifle a tige,' a weapon far superior to the old smoothbore musket in accuracy, range and penetration. The 'tige' was a steel stem in the center of the breech, around which powder was placed. By ramming the projectile onto the stern, its base could be expanded to 'take' the rifled grooves. But the real advance was the combination of an expanding conical projectile with a rifled barrel. The pointed bullet generated less wind resistance; this meant greater range, accuracy and penetration. The spin imparted by rifling stabilized its flight, also contributing to its accuracy.
These tests marked a turning point in small arms development in the U.S. In effect, Ordnance officials developed and adopted a cartridge and rifling design based on criteria of ballistic superiority. The design of the rifled musket itself was of a secondary importance. In fact, the resulting arm went through a number of design changes during the Civil War. As initially adopted, the Model 1855 rifled musket was equipped with a Maynard tape priming system; by 1861, the Armory had reverted to a simpler percussion cap. Minor revisions were made throughout the war, although the Ordnance Department classified these as model changes; the resulting Models 1863 and Model 1864 were made only at the national armory. The Armory would carry this focus on ballistics testing into the next century; after the battle of Gettysburg, as Ordnance looked to adopt its first breechloader, its first task was to develop a new metallic cartridge.
The new bullet evolved from a French design by Captain Minie; but Minie's projectile was a two-piece design, with an iron wTests conducted on the firing range were particularly concerned with accuracy and range; the rifle was placed on a heavy iron fixed rest with adjustable elevation. Every aspect of the testing was carefully controlled. Powder charges and projectiles were carefully weighed; even weather conditions on the outdoor firing range were recorded. Ordnance officers used statistical techniques to measure mean deviations from both the center of the target, and the center of the pattern. The 'aggregate mean deviation' measured horizontal and vertical deviations to a single index number denoting accuracy.
Other tests measured initial velocity by firing at close range into a 'musket ballistic pendulum,' devised by Alfred Mordecai in the 1840s. The same instrument allowed measurement of recoil. Penetration was measured by firing into a target of one-inch thick seasoned white pine planks spaced one and a half inches apart.
At 200 yards, the aggregate mean deviation of 50 shots measured 4.4" vertical and 3.4" horizontal; at 1,000 yards the measured deviations were 55.9" vertical, and 25.5" horizontal. The new arm could penetrate eleven inches of pine planking at 200 yards, and at 1,000 yards a ball passed completely through the target frame, solid white pine three inches thick. Mean initial velocity of the projectile was 963 feet per second. Ballistics tests also prompted the Ordnance Board to recommend tighter tolerances for the bore; the allowable variation in maximum bore dropped from .01" to .0025".
The result was a weapon far superior to the old musket; the new arm was more accurate at 600 yards than the old smoothbore at 300 yards. Tests at greater ranges were discontinued, as 80% of the smoothbore's shots missed the 30' by 15' target at 400 yards. In fact, the new arm was more accurate and reliable than any of the breechloading arms available; it also outperformed newly adopted French and British weapons. This newfound accuracy, combined with the use of military tactics from the smoothbore days undoubtedly accounted for the grisly casualty lists of the Civil War, and anticipated the trench warfare of World War I.
THE CRISIS - In retrospect, it is ironic that the North was taken so by surprise, and so unprepared for conflict. South Carolina had voted to secede on December 20th, 1860; by February 9th, 1861, Mississippi, Alabama, Georgia, Florida, Louisiana and Texas had joined the new Confederacy, and elected Jefferson Davis as its President. Tension at the Armory was palpable in the early months of 1861. Yet no real call to expand production came until after the attack on Fort Sumter on April 12.
As the War Department rose from slumber, the dimensions of the crisis became clear. Col. Henry Craig, of the Ordnance Department, had inventoried only 480,687 rifles and muskets in federal arsenals as of January 21, 1861; of these 56,362 were in arsenals in Augusta, Georgia and Fayetteville, North Carolina. Ex-Secretary of War John B. Floyd had shipped 65,000 percussion muskets and 40,000 percussion conversions to Southern arsenals in late 1859, removing these arms from the northern theater and placing them in confederate hands. As Virginia, North Carolina, Tennessee and Arkansas joined the Confederacy, still more arms were placed out of reach of Union forces. The loss of Harpers Ferry to Virginia militia also meant the loss of fifty percent of federal arms-making capacity, and provided a full set of armsmaking machinery for the Richmond Armory.
Only 109,000 muskeThe Union turned first to international arms markets; Col. G.L. Schuyler, of the New York sporting goods firm Schuyler, Hartley and Graham traveled to Europe as purchasing agent for the United States. The War Department intended to buy rifled arms, but as these were just being adopted for use by foreign military services, very few were available. Both Confederate and Union Army representatives ended up in competition, bidding on whatever arms were available. Large numbers of older smoothbore muskets, or otherwise inferior arms were purchased in Europe by both sides. The Union purchased nearly a million foreign arms, mostly in the early years of the war. As the war progressed, the Ordnance Department made a point of encouraging domestic self-sufficiency, and discontinued foreing purchases. Despite the low quality of many of these arms, Union purchases at least kept them from falling into Confederate hands. Of the foreign arms that entered service, only the British Enfield was in any way comparable to the Springfield rifled musket. And these rifles were not immediately on hand; the first deliveries were received late in 1861. The limited number of arms still in Union-held arsenals, along with these newly purchased foreign arms, provided the Union Army during the first year of war.
In the meantime, the War Department turned again to the old contract system. But instead of putting contracts out to bid, as required by law, the War Department apparently panicked, placing advertisements for arms and arms contractors in the Spring of 1861. A number of parties answered these advertisements; over thirty contractors signed on to manufacture complete arms. The first contracts were signed in July, 1861. Most of these 'contracts' were simple letters of agreement, typically offered $20 each for finished arms 'of the same pattern, and equal in quality' to the Springfield rifled musket. This hastily conceived policy flooded the market with contracts for large numbers of arms, far in excess of the immediate needs of the Union army. Between July 1861 and July 1862 contracts were let for 1,164,000 arms. By the end of the war, that figure had risen to over one and a half million arms.
Although the contracts specified that deliveries were to commence within six months, no arms were delivered under any of these contracts until far later. The first arms were not received until August 16, 1862. Even the Colt company, the largest and best-equipped private firearms company in the world, did not commence regular deliveries until September 26, 1862. This outcome was predictable to anyone who fully understood Armory practice. Assembling the plant and machinery for interchangeable production was an expensive proposition; the jigs, fixtures and gauges required time and specialized skill labor. The sudden demand for arms ensured that skilled labor, or at least trained armorers, would be in short supply. And the contracts specificed that '...all and each of the said twenty-five thousand muskets to interchange in their similar parts with each other, and with the Springfield muskets....'
Unfortunately, the War Department was less than discriminating in its choice of contractors. Contracts were seemingly awarded to virtually anyone who applied. Contracts were awarded to parties with no experience in armsmaking; worse, many went to parties with no existing plant and equipment. Some were awarded on the basis of political patronage and bribery. One Rhode Island manufacturer, Casper Schubarth, persuaded U.S. Senator Simmons of Rhode Island to accompany him in a meeting with the Assistant Secretary of War; Simmons was to receive a 5% commission on the contract in return for the service. Contracts were bought and sold among parties on speculation. Within a short period, so many arms were contracted for that the Ordnance Depar in the course of one day in New York, by brokers speculating in arms contracts. Wheelock was in New York at the time to attempt to win a contract for his company, as yet unable to obtain any government work.
Aside from the speculation and political intrigues, many contractors simply had no experience in the manufacture of arms. One contractor, John Rice, was a stonemason and carpenter by trade; he was working as a stonemason on the new Capitol in Washington at the time his contract was awarded. Other contractors, like Addison Burt, had industrial experience, but no physical plant. Burt had abandoned an industrial works in Richmond, where he made springs for railroad cars. Burt leased the Trenton locomotive works to manufacture muskets. Others were well-meaning businessmen, who assumed they would subcontract the arms, or at least the bulk of parts, out to other firms. A number of these contracts went unfulfilled.
With so many contracted for, and not yet delivered, on March 13, 1862, the Secretary of War appointed a special 'Commission on Ordnance and Ordnance Stores" to review these contracts. The Commission posted advertisements in the New York Herald and other newspapers, that 'All persons claiming to have any contract...are required, within fifteen days from this date, to give written notice...with a statement, in writing, of what has been done under it....' The same order also prohibited further purchases and contracts in foreign countries. Through March and April, 1862, all parties holding arms contracts appeared before the Commission; all were required to give statements and progress reports. A number of these contracts were reduced, or voided altogether where little progress had been made.
The Commission's final report to the Secretary of War of July 1, 1862, contains written testimony by the contractors; although many were far along in preparations, and had invested considerable sums in new physical plant and machinery, more were close to being ready to deliver arms. The testimony paints a rich picture of the chaotic arms market, as the numerous parties attempted to assemble the necessary machinery and technical knowledge to execute the contracts. The testimony is also revealing in other regards. Although at least 32 parties contracted to deliver finished arms, only 23 of these contractors made any recorded deliveries. The testimony also indicates that any differences between the 'complete arms' contractors and 'parts' contractors were in degree rather than in kind. Very few 'complete arms' contractors made all components in-house; most subcontracted for components, broadcasting armory practice still more widely through the northern economy.
The firm of E. Remington & Sons came up for special condemnation in the Committee's report: 'And it should be here stated that to Mr. S. Remington, of this firm, we are indebted for the first trustworthy information received touching the actual cost to private manufacturers of this arm. His public record, in frankly and voluntarily making this disclosure, is worthy of all commendation, and should it result, as we believe it will, in fixing the price of this gun at not exceeding sixteen dollars, his action will save millions to the public treasury....'
Samuel Remington came forward to explain the concept of economies of scale, still not well understood, to the Committee. Remington had been offered a contract for only 10,000 rifled muskets; as he pointed out the necessary losses involved in equipping a plant for limited production numbers. Since Remington's shops were already set up to manufacture revolvers; and private sales were brisk at prices above government sales, they could afford to sell pistols at low prices 'without particular reference to quantity.... But these considerations do not apply to the rifle. The use make 50,000 Springfield muskets with triangular bayonet, subject to inspection of the ordnance department, at $16 each....'
Colt's early wartime contracts allowed $25 per pistol; Remington's pistols were sold under early contracts for $15 each. By the end of the war, Remington's undertook pistol contracts at $12.
Despite the haphazard policy, a number of firms well-qualified and well-equipped to make arms were also awarded contracts. At least twenty-three firms completed and delivered arms under these contracts; other extant specimens of Springfield model 1861 rifle muskets lend evidence that some firms manufactured arms for which no deliveries or contracts are recorded. Some firms, such as Colt's Patent Firearms Company and E. Remington & Sons had previous experience in manufacturing weapons for the government, and well-equipped private armories. Other firms, such as Amoskeag Manufacturing Company, Alfred Jenks' Bridesburg works and William Mason were producers of textile machinery, and had well-equipped shops in place. William Mason was also an experienced locomotive builder. Other contractors, such as C.B. Hoard of Watertown, N.Y. had produced steam engines. The Providence Tool Company commenced manufacture of arms for the first time during the Civil War; they had formerly produced bevel tools and ship's chandlery hardware.
With the exception of a few of the private armories, war contracting offered these firms their first exposure to interchangeable manufacture, and the multifarious special-purpose machinery, jigs, fixtures and gauges used to effect it. And these firms - the contractors who contracted to manufacture completed arms - were hardly the only ones to encounter armory practice for the first time. Hundreds of other firms contracted to build machinery, or worked as subcontractors, manufacturing parts, appendages or accoutrements either for these contractors, or directly for the Springfield Armory.
If Blanchard's early production line of stocking equipment represented a 'microcosm of the American system,' by the time of the Civil War, the Armory's integrated production system represented a turnkey factory for metalworking. WIth milling and profiling machinery, multiple-spindle drill presses, clamp millers, drop forging equipment, and punch presses, the Armory's production system by now was a microcosm of modern machine shop practice. Between the second-generation stocking equipment and the evolving metalworking machinery, the machinery fixtures and sets of 64 precision gauges, this production equipment represented state-of-the art manufacturing for the period. The kinematics embodies in this machinery presented the means of for producing virtually any component with dimension. Over the course of the war, this production methodology was made available not only to the twenty-three contractors who completed finished arms, but to the hundreds of subcontractors who produced component parts, and more importantly, to the machinery builders who reproduced Armory patterns for all. The Armory's machinery patterns, and detailed mechanical drawings travelled throughout the North, especially in the early years of the war. By early 1862, the patterns were so well travelled that the Armory began to access standard charges of 1/2 cent per pound, for castings made from them. Orders for the machinery were so common that the machinery builders, in making requests to borrow patterns, often knew their whereabouts. For instance, William Herrick, of Northampton, Massachusetts, in requesting the use of the Armory's rifling machine patterns: 'I have an order for a Rifling machine from the Amoskeag Mfg. Co., MancheThe broad diffusion of this production system in the North may well be the most important legacy of the Civil War. A number of firms that arose in response to the early defense contracting, subsequently exported the technology throughout Europe. If the United States's rise to international industrial prominence rode the back of Fordism, its first principles were broadcast throughout the North during the Civil War.
At least immediately, the net effect of these contracts was chaos in the arms market. As these new contractors began to assemble the necessary machinery and workmen, firms experience in building arms-making machinery were slammed with far more orders than they could deliver. The new contractors also wound up competing with established arms firms and the Springfield Armory for machinery, raw materials and skilled labor. As they attempted to hire experienced foremen to supervise the work, they created an immediate shortage; worse, as they began to order machinery, these contractors ended up in competition with the Springfield Armory and other established concerns for the specialized machinery needed to execute the contracts. Contractors demands for pattern weapons and technical advice, particularly among the inexperienced contractors, threatened to overwhelm the Springfield Armory's ability to provide these services, at a time when the Armory was marshalling its resources to increase its own production.
Often, where a contractor was successful at purchasing a suit of stocking machinery, he would end up being offered subcontracts for finished stocks by other parties less successful at obtaining the specialized machinery. Most decided to subcontract for rough barrels; the construction of rolling mills for rolling and welding barrels was far too capital-intensive for most to attempt. One supplier who invested in the rolling mill equipment, Nathan Washburne of Worcester, Massachusetts, had orders for 300,000 rough barrels from other contractors. But Washburne was having some difficulty in obtaining suitable iron, and getting the newly-installed rolling equipment to weld inspectable barrels. As these contractors, and the hundreds of subcontractors who received orders through them, began to look for information on the requisite machinery, gauges, and arms specifications, they turned to the Springfield Armory for technical assistance.
Although these contracts initially specified that arms were to 'interchange with it (a Springfield rifle-musket) and each other in all their parts...' the Ordnance Department soon recognized the folly of holding contractors to such still standards. James Ripley, who managed the Armory during the 1840s, when interchangeable arms first became a reality, was clearly in a position to know. Now Chief of Ordnance, Ripley wrote to Secretary of War E.M. Stanton on 8 August 1862: 'SIR. In the cases of contractors for furnishing rifle muskets of the Springfield pattern, it is found impossible, as I always supposed it would be, to hold the contractors to the strict, literal fulfillment of all the conditions of their contracts. But under the present necessities for arms, and as the contractors have incurred large expenses in preparing for their manufacture, I am disposed to be liberal to them, in not exacting so rigid and close inspection as is required at the United States Armory....I do not think that the present urgent need of arms will justify the usual minute and detailed inspection and gauging of every part, and the rejection for blemishes not impairing any serviceable quality. The main point, and one ot be rigidly enforced, is to secure arms of the prescribed caliber, of good strong barrels, stocks, and locks, and in all respects serviceable as military weapons....'
After August, 1862, inspectors were instructed to pass arms 'serviceable as military weapons...' subject to a classificaTHE ARMORY - The outbreak of hostilities found the Armory actively performing its role as clearinghouse for new production technologies - ironically, the beneficiaries were a number of southern states on the verge of secession. Armory personnel directly abetted the southern cause by providing drawings and plans for new state armories in Georgia and Louisiana, as well as opening its shop space to representatives of the state of Virginia. New barrel welding equipment had just been installed at Harpers Ferry, with the assistance of the Ames Company and Armory personnel. In fact, Superintendent James Barbour of Harpers Ferry had been in the North consulting with Nathan Ames regarding the new rolling mill as John Brown's small band seized that armory.
Production kinks at Harpers Ferry were not yet resolved by the beginning of war. A panicked telegram arrived at the Armory on March 4, 1861, requesting assistance at the new rolling mill. Although Springfield could not spare its only barrel maker, William Onions, to travel to the Ferry, the Armory received Mr. P. Burkart, principle foreman of the barrel department there to view operations at Springfield's new rolling mill. Burkart apparently did not arrive at Springfield until April 9th, 1861, three days before the attack on Fort Sumter, carrying letters of introduction from Barbour's successor Armistead Ball....
As the Armory attempted to expand its output, bottlenecks in the production system inevitably arose. The first bottlenecks to arise were in stockmaking and barrel welding. The Armory scoured the country to lay in supplies of black walnut for stocks; since the stocks needed to be seasoned for three years, adequate supplies were crucial. Dwight also placed order for new stocking machinery. The most intractable production bottleneck was in the barrel welding department. As Superintendent Dwight noted in a letter to Captain Benton of Ordnance 'Barrel rolling depends upon one man. I have sent to England for another....' That man was William Onions, an English master roller who have been brought over to supervise production with the new British rolling mill. In addition, the armory had sent to England for a spare set of rolls, so that the mill could be quickly repaired in case of an accident. As the Armory attempted to increase barrel production, the immediate constraint was that no one but Onions really knew how to operate the new mill. The politics of expansion were probably made more difficult as Onions was employed as an 'inside contractor,' hiring his own help.
In one example of wartime cooperation, Troy Nail Works superintendent William F. Burden, attempted to entice another master roler, Thomas Brown, to the Armory from Montreal; unfortunately Brown declined the post. Burden next offered to lend temporarily one of his rollers, which was politely declined. Ironically, it was Burden's father, Henry Burden, who had designed and built the Armory's first rolling mill for Roswell Lee in the 1820s. Lee and Burden's experiments with rolling barrels thirty years before had been halted by Lee's death.
As the Armory solved production backlogs in one branch, another would fall behind. By July, the inspectors were so far behind that they too were ordered to work twelve-hour days. Skilled armorers were reassigned to inspection duty. By October 31, rifling barrels had become the major bottleneck, and the Armory was 'sharing' three or four rifling machines with Colt's.
A number of loyalist workmen migrated north to Springfield with the destruction of Harpers Ferry. Two of these workmen, John T. Kilham and Thomas Russell. arrived at Springfield looking for work. Both had provided assistance to the small band of U.S. troops on guard duty at Harpers Ferry, led by Lienews created great excitement, the shops were closed, every man leaving his work to learn. Capt. Kinsbury and Lieut. Jones went through the armory and requested all loyal citizens to assist in the protection of government property....About nine o'clock our advance picket halted the advance guard of the rebels numbering 360 men with four pieces of artillery. We then sent two runners to Jones with the news of the approach of the advance guard and also that there was a force of over 2000 men not more than ten miles distant marching upon the town. We remained there parleying with them until Lieut. Jones had fired the arsenal and made good his retreat across the bridge into Maryland. For my energy in getting out the company and for my Union sentiments previously and freely expressed I had to fly from my home, stealing away to the next town early in the morning in order to take the train for Wheeling....'
Both men fled Harpers Ferry in the aftermath, with Russell leaving his family there. Kilham's application was initially turned down; Superintendent Dwight had received blanket orders to hire no one from an seceding state. But with letters of references from both Lieutenant Jones and Captain J.G. Benton of the Ordnance Department, Kilham eventually prevailed. Kilham worked at the Armory through May and June, then left for Washington to act as a guide for the army. Russell was not offered employment, but he received orders to travel back to Harpers Ferry, behind enemy lines, to recruit loyalist armorers and offer them employment at Springfield. Russell remained at the Armory through the war, later becoming an inspector of arms.
Despite the flurry of activity, the Armory's early attempts at expansion appear chimerical when contrasted with the ratcheting activity beginning in August, 1861. Despite purchasing large number of new machine tools, hiring more workers and extending work hours, production numbers remained low. For the entire year of 1861, production remained below 14,000 arms. Employment at the Armory was higher, with 400 employees by August, but not yet close to its wartime peak of 2,467 in 1864. No one could seriously argue that a real transformation had taken place....
But by the Civil War, a number of private firms had technology to share with the Armory. Probably the most important acquisition was improvements in drop forging. The Armory updated its forging equipment with new compound crank drops designed by Samuel Colt's superintendent, E.K. Root. Root had previously designed machinery to automate axe production at the Collins Axe Company in Connecticut. As axe production involved heavier forgings than were used in arms production at the time, Root's training was ideal for Colt. These new drop forges were capable of forming deep, complex parts in a single blow. By September 30, 1861, Dyer was ordering eight new Root-designed compound crank drop forges form Pacific Iron Works. Four more were ordered directly from Colt. The Armory continued to buy improved forging equipment throughout the war, from a number of suppliers.
Further improvements in forging came from Sharps Rifle Company's Richard S. Lawrence and William B. Hicks. Lawrence had supervised construction of drop forges for the Armory, incorporating Hick's improvement. Dyer, impressed with these new drops, commissioned Hicks to supervise the construction of ten more With respect to milling machinery, both the Ames Company and George Lincoln had improved upon Armory designs, and developed their own patterns. James Ames described this 'new' pattern that had replaced the rack feed with a screw feed; this enabled the worktable to 'run back faster.' The Lincoln millers were designed by Francis Pratt, but named for his employer, George Lincoln. The Armory took advantage of these improvements as well; by September, 1861, Dyer was placing his new orders for 24 Lincoln millers from Wood, Light and Company. In addition to the machinery orders, Dyer contacted H.G. Buckley to build kiln at the Armory for steam-drying stocks; Bulkley held patents on the process.
Throughout the war, the Armory continued to rely on outside machinery builders. Notable among these was William Sellers. As Joseph Wickham Roe notes, 'Probably no one has had a greater influence on machine tools in America than William Sellers.' With the exception of Wood, Light and Company, Sellers probably built more machinery for the Armory than any other single firm. Sellers fabricated large numbers of specialized machine tools for the Armory during the Civil War; initially using Armory patterns and drawings. But Sellers also went on to make his own patterns. In March of 1862, Sellers contracted to manufacture both rifling machines and a lock edging machine for the Armory; Sellers was particularly interested in the lock edging machine. 'We would be glad to make the machines you ask for particularly the edging machines, as we have no patterns and would be glad to add them to our stock.'
Like the Ordnance Department, Sellers was an early advocate for standardization. In April 1864, as president of the Franklin Institute, Sellers presented a paper on 'A System of Screw Threads and Nuts.' Sellers disapproved of the British Whitworth system, and proposed his own standard; Sellers' system was subsequently adopted by the U.S. Government in 1868, and by the International Congress in Zurich, in 1898. Sellers was known for designing heavier machine tools than was the norm, and finishing them plainly in 'machine grey.' Sellers was among the first to delete from his machinery designs such as the decorative beadings and moldings, and architectural embellishments common in the period.
In addition to contracting for specialized armsmaking machinery, the Armory purchased a number of Sellers-designed planers and lathes, as well as broaching machinery, screw-making machinery and hoisting equipment. The Armory was not always as impressed as Roe with the build quality of Sellers' machinery; Dyer noted problems with wear in the spindle boxes of Sellers' milling machines, and complained 'The rifling machine had required almost daily repairs...we have not been able to get any thing like as much work out as with the old machinery. But Sellers provided other services; Sellers agreed to arbitrate a dispute between the Armory and R. Hoe and Co. over a controversial billing for fourteen rifling machines.
After the war, Sellers continued to work with the War and Navy Departments, designing a 128 foot lathe to turn sixteen-inch cannon for the Naval Gun Factory. Sellers' firm also provided the structural work for the Brooklyn Bridge and collaborated in the development of power generation at Niagara Falls. Also of lasting importance, as president of the Midvale Steel Company, Sellers financed and supported the long-running experiments of Frederick W. TayloAlong with the dramatic expansion of the Armory's stable of machinery, probably the most important decision of the war was Dyer's aggressive pursuit of parts subcontracting. Contracts were made with the Massachusetts Arms Company for delivery of 3,000 finished locks per month, as well as some gauge sets. The company also made spare parts for the Model 1822 and 1842 muskets. Sharp's Rifle Company was offered a contract for 10,000 rear sights. The following week, Dyer sent his predecessor, George Dwight, on a special detail to Boston, Worcester and Milbury to ascertain 'whether contracts can be made with parties to furnish the United States with spare parts of Muskets.'
Almost from the outset, the Armory subcontracted for appendages: the screwdrivers, wipers, spring vices, tompions and repair tools shipped out with its rifled muskets. The H.A. Chapin Company of Bridgeport, Connecticut was already making screwdrivers by July of 1861; that month the Armory loaned Chapin a long list of tools to manufacture wipers. By September, Chapin was offered contract for rear sights. This time the Armory was less forthcoming with loans of tools; Chapin estimated that deliveries would be delayed 60-90 days due to the necessity of erecting 'much fine, nice machinery.' By the end of 1861, Chapin had expanded his shops and machinery to an estimated capacity of 33,000 sets of appendages per month.
These early contracts set the stage for a continuing feature of wartime production. Throughout the war years, Springfield Armory continued to contract with hundreds of parties for large, batch production component parts. Subcontracted work was often less critical in terms of tolerances; in cases where tolerances were critical, the Armory brought rough parts, and finished them in house. From rear sights to screws, stock tips and butt plates, to mainsprings, bayonets, ramrods and cones, large orders for component parts were let throughout the war. Butt plates and stock tips were received rough, and finished at the Armory. Percussion cones were purchased either finished, or untempered so as to 'gauge better,' and tempered at the Armory. Ramrods and bayonets were typically purchased complete. Rough barrels were occasionally purchased, and turned, bored and rifled at the Armory. This batch production of small parts outside the Armory was probably the most crucial factor in enabling the Armory's twenty-fold increase in production.
By January 1862, the Armory received a second new steam engine from Woodruff and Beach, this time for the Water Shops. These shops had been newly built in 1854-55, and housed the Armory's rolling mill and heavy forging operations. Steam was added to guarantee against production interruptions caused by ice or low water conditions; it also enabled the Armory to expand its heavy forging and barrel rolling operations. The Armory continued to add machinery on the Hill, with fourteen new rifling machines from R. Hoe and Co. of New York, and another ten stocking machines from the Ames Company. By January of 1862; employment at the Armory had risen to 1,309; by March of 1862, the Armory had greatly expanded its milling, polishing and stocking facilities on the Hill; for the first time the spatial arrangement of the Hill Shops began the order of production processes.
The Armory particularly concentrated on 'finishing' tools; the milling machines, rifling machines, lock edging machines, and stocking equipment that was used to bring rough parts to their final dimensions. Orders for machine tools were incessant, as the Armory built up its machinery stock and capacity. The new Main Arsenal, built in 1846-1850, allowed the conversion of three oldernishing of rough parts. By about August of 1862, most the new machinery was in place. The Armory continued to add machinery of all stripes throughout the war; but not at the sheer scale of purchases from August, 1861 through the following year. After that time, orders were based more toward general machine tools, such as lathes and planers. Continued purchases of specialized armsmaking tools were simply on a smaller scale.
In the meantime, parties with contracts to produce finished arms and components were beginning to put their shops in order. Frederick Howe, superintendent of the Providence Tool Company, had come to the Armory in late July, 1861 to fabricate gauges and fixtures. By early March, Dyer had to discontinue the privilege, as Alfred Jenks, another contractor, sent his own team in to make gauges. The contractors were beginning to learn from each other's mistakes. C.B. Hoard, a third contractor, applied for the same privilege in April, noting that Jenks had earlier made gauges from a sample gun, and 'found himself all wrong' in working from it. Yet another feature of Civil War contracting was the new practice of requesting parts in multiple production stages. Typically, these parts were provided in three production stages; contractors thus had models for each stage of the production process. This practice undoubtedly eased the difficult task of duplicating Armory processes. Full sets of rough parts were provided to a number of contractors, as well as to the Spanish Army.
Even experienced contractors had difficulties bringing their shops up to speed. A.H. Waters of Milbury, Massachusetts contracted to make ramrods, bayonets and trigger guards for the Armory. By January, 1862, he had built a new shop with power, gearing, planers, twenty milling machines, and noted that his dies, jigs and gauges were nearly completed. Three months later, Waters was still behind, and receiving pressure from the Armory. Waters was especially having difficulty with the bayonets, falling far behind on his parts order. By April 9th, Waters was still having difficulty: 'We have found that Tools & Machinery however perfectly made, require a great deal of turning before they will make music acceptable to the touch of the U.S. Inspector and in this process is a great loss of time. But we are happy to believe & say that we have now brought our tools up to 'Concert pitch' & are progressing not only rapidly but musically to the Key Note of the Inspector.'
Another contractor, Nathan Harrington, apologized for delays in delivering contract bayonets, noting 'the Severe, but valuable lesson which the Inspector has given us....'
At the same time, many of the contractors had also gotten their shops in order; Alfred Jenks of Bridesburg, Pennsylvania ahd commenced deliveries on August 16, 1862; Colt's began deliveries in late September. The Providence Tool Company submitted its first arms in May of 1863. With these and other contractors on line, the Armory also had new sources for component parts; where Armory supplies came up short, these contractors could be turned to for parts.
By July of 1862, the Armory was apparently fully staffed; new applicants were informed that its shops were full. Production rates were not beginning to outstrip supplies of raw materials and components. The Arcade Mal Iron Works of Worcester, Massachusetts, had been supplying stock tips and butt plates for some time; orders were increased to '1,000 tips per day,ewitt never made the trip; the War Department ruled in favor of domestic self-sufficiency: 'Moreover if it is probable that such an article can be procured at home, it is the plain duty of the Government to encourage its production, and to use it to the exclusion of the foreign article.' The Ordnance Department instead expanded its use of American iron' by November 18, 1863, Dyer informed Marshall and Mills, 'We buy no more foreign barrel iron.'
By the end of 1862, the Armory had raised its production to 102.410, nearly a tenfold increase from 1861. Employment levels had risen to 2,213 by January of 1863. The Armory had clearly turned the corner in its ability to supply arms for the Union Army. In retrospect, the only fact more astonishing than the sheer increases in production numbers, is the timetable on which it was accomplished.
Other evidence that the Armory's production system was well in place comes from the cancellation of parts contracts. By October 4th, 1862, orders went out to Cooper and Hewitt to 'send no more iron; I am now rolling more barrels than I can finish.' One year later, Dyer turned down an offer for rear sights, noting 'I have given no orders for sights...within the last year and a half, and at this time we are able to make more than are required.' The year 1863 marked the first full year of production with its expansion in place; that year the Armory provided another 217,784 finished arms for the Union Army.
For the first time since the beginning of war, Armory officials could turn their attention to matters other than increasing raw production figures. And turn they did. Production was initiated on a new model rifle-musket; in reality an evolutionary change from the Model 1861, but one that incorporated improvements already applied to the 'Special' Model 1861, which was designed in consultation between the Colt Company and Armory officials. The most visible changes were a redesigned hammer and a new cone seat, which dispensed with its mounting screw. The new arm also returned to a ramrod spring, eliminating the tendency of the ramrod 'swell' to stick in wet conditions.
With the new model, the Armory also found itself in possession of large numbers of spare parts for the 'old' Model 1861. The sheer numbers involved give some idea of the scale of production and batch contracting taking place during the war years. Parts inventories reveal that the Armory had in stock 12,000 complete locks; 32,000 complete guards, 30,000 upper bands, 75,000 vent screws, and 50,000 each guard, sear, and bridle screws. These 'spare parts' were offered for sale to the contractors.
The Armory was also offering new production methods; Dyer discontinued purchases of butt plates; there were now forged on the Armory's new drop forges, instead of cast from malleable iron. The new Model 1863 hammer was also forged on the new drops. And Dyer continued to inquire after newly-developed bayonet rolling machinery, designed by Harvey Waters of Northbridge, Massachusetts. This machinery was capable of rolling four bayonets per minute; a more typical figure was 1,500 per day. This machinery obviated the need for expensive milling operations. Although the Armory had first offered to buy patent rights to this process in June, 1862, the rolls were not finally installed and in operation until June of 1864.
The Armory was also saddled with the acquisition and inspection of artillery harness and accoutremenThe close of 1863 brought a second steam engine to the water shops, and orders for a new Corliss steam engine on the hill. The continued addition of new machinery had finally stressed the capabilities of the existing steam engines. The Armory purchased from Wood, Light & Company of Worcester a new machine 'for testing the required horsepower for a given line of shafting.' Attempts to coax a few more horsepower from the old watershops engine had been fruitless; Dyer purchased a used Woodruff and Beach engine to augment power there.
The close of 1863 also brought new experiments with breechloading arms. Chief of Ordnance James Ripley ordered six experimental carbines made by both Joslyn Arms and Ball & Williams, makers of the Ballard carbine, in November, 1863; the Armory also sent personnel to the respective factories to facilitate rapid completion. These guns were to be .44 caliber, with .52 caliber chambers, of varying lengths to accept cartridges ranging from 35 grains to 60 grains. Just as it had in 1854 and 1855, the Armory focused first on cartridge development. The Armory simply never had any intention of adopting an existing breechloader; Ordnance officials would instead develop their own cartridge, and survey existing designs for operating the breech. Over the next few months, requests for different breechloaders went out to Sharps & Hankins, New Haven Arms Company, and others. Correspondence indicates that the Armory was finishing and chambering the barrels for its own cartridges; subsequent requests were for unrifled barrels, caliber .42.
From 1864 through the end, Armory production remained well in hand. At least from correspondence, production occupied the attention of Armory officials only when something went wrong. Armory officials were looking ahead, to postwar expansion, and the eventual adoption of a new breechloading rifle. By January, 1864, the Armory employed a workforce of 2,467; wartime production levels reached their zenith at 276,200 arms. As Armory officials planned for the new-visible postwar future, local lithographer Milton Bradley received orders: 'You will proceed without delay to New York City and obtain there a photograph from the plan of a new Armory recently drawn by you, provided the same can be sized to your satisfaction. This duty having been performed you will return to this Armory.'
The Boston firm Shedd & Edson were hired to make topographic drawings of the public grounds; a New York architect, Mr. Derrick, was sent Bradley's photographic plates of the proposed armory.
A fire, originating in the attic of the polishing shops interrupted Armory operations on the evening of July 2, 1864. Unlike the fires under Ripley's tenure, this time the citizens of Springfield were commended: 'Every assistance which could have been asked was promptly and cheerfully provided by the citizens of Springfield and its fire companies....'
The fire destroyed the polishing shops, and damaged 47 milling machines directly beneath; tempering forges for springs were also destroyed. Given the Armory's annual production figures, Superintendent A.B. Dyer made good on his promise: 'The product of the Armory will be considerably diminished during the next two months, but I have no hesitation in saying that this diminution will be made good during the following four months of the year.' The Armory pushed ahead as usual, simply subcontracting to a New Haven firm the polishing of its butt plates, at a rate of 3,000 per week.
Otherwise, the Armory began to rebuild its shops, and continued its experiments with breechloading arms. These experiments were held continuously through October of 1864; Armory tests included carbines by Joslyn, Ballard, Sharps and Hankins, Henry, Merrill, Palmer, Peabody, Spencer and Smith. These experiments were apparently exploratory, as tThese experiments marked a continuation of earlier development work on a newly-designed centerfire cartridge invented by George Morse. The Ordnance Board had tested a number of breechloading arms at Washington Arsenal from February through April, 1860. Although none of these breechloaders was officially adopted as a service arm, Ordnance officers were very impressed with George Morse's early centerfire metallic cartridge: 'Morse's cartridge is considered excellent, having the cap in the end, which is surer of igniting the change...and there is no escape of gas from the breech. The board therefore recommends that experiments be made with the view of adopting Morse's cartridge to a simpler form of opening the breech.'
Although the board judged the breech mechanism 'too complicated,' the board recommended that experiments be made to adapt Morse's cartridge to a simpler breech. Officers noted that having the percussion cap in direct communication with the cartridge provided sure ignition, as compared to those arms using separate percussion caps, and also recognized the clear advantage: '...and there is no escape of gas from the breech.'
Armory personnel had worked directly with George Morse to develop and test the new cartridge and weapons to use it; numerous types of runner, leather, and rubberized cloth had been tried as wadding. By February, 1861, the Armory was confident enough to place an order for 600,000 Morse cartridges with the Frankford Arsenal. The Armory also fabricated three carbines: two 'guard lock' carbines, Cal. .44 and .50, with a third barrel, Cal. .54; and one 'side lock' carbine. The coming of war precluded the adoption of this advanced weapon, or the luxury of further experiments with breechloading arms until late 1863. The tooling and models were eventually shipped to the Palmetto Armory in South Carolina, and a small number were produced for the southern cause.
Superintendent A.B. Dyer left the Armory in October of 1864 to follow in the footsteps of his predecessor, James Ripley, as Chief of Ordnance. Major T.T.S. Laidley officially took command October 27th. The Armory continued to buy some small parts; but discontinued the purchase of stock tips in November; these were subsequently formed of wrought iron on the Armory's drop forges.
The elections of 1864 brought some trepidation to Springfield; Laidley thought wise to order 5,000 buck and ball cartridges 'as I wish to be prepared should there be any disturbance about the election next week.' The close of the year brought new lighting to the Water Shops, as the Connecticut firm Parker, Snow & Co. installed a new 'hydro-Carbon-vapor-gas' system; far brighter than conventional gas light, these probably eased night work at the water shops considerably.
The Armory produced its first breechloading rifles in this period; in December of 1864, Armory officials contracted with the Joslyn Firearms Company for 3,000 breech caps and tang pieces; these were assembled into complete arms at the Armory. Quality control problems were rife; a shipment of components received in early January differed 'in size very materially from those previously sent....' Late deliveries of the components held up completion of these rifles until after the close of the war. Laidley noted his dissatisfaction to Chief of Ordnance A.B. Dyer, 'I had determined to return to the Joslyn Fire Arms Co. all the caps and tangs they had sent here except one thousand picked out from the whole number. They are made so indifferently and the parts fit into each other with so little accuracy that I feel apprehension that accidents will result from placing them in the hands of troops.' These short manufacturing runs brought advertisements for 30 stockers '...competent to complete Stocks without aid of machinery....' Advertisements were posted in PhiladBy 1865, it was all over but the shouting. Employment at the Armory fell for the first time since the coming of war. By January 1865, employment at the Armory had dropped to 2,298; down from 2,467 in the same month of 1864. Overall production levels remained high for the year - 195,341 arms - especially impressive since the Armory began to reduce its workforce with the close of war.
The Armory's informal experiments with breechloading arms were replaced by formal Ordnance Board trials; sessions commenced January 4, 1865. These trials were limited to weapons using metallic ammunition; other designs, especially those which used a percussion cap separate from the cartridge, were politely declined. The Armory still had a strong bias toward centerfire cartridges as well, one inventor was informed. 'It is probable that a center primed cartridge will be adopted as the standard.' Laidley also advised the Burnside Rifle Company against a patent battle on a method of priming rimfire cartridges, as 'In a very short time the centre fire cartridge will be used to the exclusion of the other, and Mr. Lewis will never make enough from his patent to pay his lawyers.' Inventors whose weapons passed this initial screening, i.e. whose weapons used self-primed metallic ammunition, were required to present their arms to the Board with a written statement giving the 'name, number and kind of arm, and the advantages over others. The least sum that will be accepted for the right to make them by the Government will be stated. The agent for the gun will then fire it and explain the manner of its working, then leave it with the Board for further trial.'
The Board was in session for less than a month. A number of inventors were late; Oliver Winchester wanted three months to deliver his weapon; Sharps Rifle and Providence Tool Company were also late in submitting their arms. Rather than continue the trials, the Board recessed until March 15 to wait for these and other guns to be submitted. The delay may have proved propitious as well, as the Armory's 'photographic instrument' was sent to New York for repairs.
The Armory continued its development work on its own design for .50 caliber cartridges, one and six tenths inches long, apparently using a Spencer carbine as a test-bed. The Armory was also developing its own machinery to form the groove at the base of the bullet, and had developed a preferred lubricant, 'two parts of paraffin wax and one part of bayberry tallow.' As Laidley reported to Captain Crispin, 'The cartridges made here with 45 grs. of powder and 390 grs. ball gave the best results. Christopher Spencer, the inventor, 'expressed himself so well satisfied with it, that I saw no reason to make any changes....' Not limiting themselves to cartridges, Laidley fired off an urgent letter to Spencer during the Ordnance Board trials in late March: 'I have made an improvement in the working of your gun & it is important that you should see it that your gun may be rendered as perfect as possible. I know Gen'l Dyer will direct that the modifications shall be made.'
By the time the Ordnance Board resumed its trials on March 15, the war was all but over. The Confederate Congress had authorized the use of slaves as troops two days before; by April 3, federal troops entered Richmond. President Lincoln arrived the following day. The Board assembled to review to review forty different breechloader designs; but by this point the Ordnance Department was under no real pressure to adopt any particular rifle. The Board also invited a distinguished visitor, Lieutenant Colonel W.A. Raashoff, representing the armed forces of Denmark to view the trials. But for all intents and purposes, the Board's trials were anticlimactic. The Armory would work in fits and starts for a number of years after, before finally adopting a rifle designed by Springfield Master's Armorer, Erskine Allin. With the coming of peace, there was little hattox Court House.
With the close of war, Springfield began to lay off many of its workers. By January, 1866, employment was 723, still far above its prewar levels, but well below wartime peaks. The Armory arranged with the Ames Company to send six gilt bronze eagles to General J.M. Gibbon of the Army of the Potomac in Richmond. Whether these were to be used as a peace offering for or for parade purposes is unknown, but the six were sent to Richmond by June 6th. Twelve photographic prints of the forty breechloaders submitted for trial were donated to the Soldier's Fair in Chicago. And for the Armory, finally the war was over." - Bruce Tull