Send us your own comments about this object.

Title:	RIFLE, MILITARY -  U.S. RIFLE M1C .30 SN# 3688496
Maker/Manufacturer:	GARAND, JOHN C.
Date of Manufacture:	04/01/1945
Eminent Figure:
Catalog Number:	SPAR 3362
Measurements:	OL:116.8CM 46" BL: 60.9CM 24"

Object Description:

U.S. RIFLE M1C .30 SN# 3688496
Manufactured by Springfield Armory, Springfield, Ma. - Sniper version of M1 rifle adopted in June 1944. Semi-automatic, 8-round clip-loaded weapon. Equipped with M81 telescope sight (SPAR-7190), T6 cheek rest (SPAR-5507 moved to 117/6) and M2 flash hider. Weapon rebarreled in 1952. Weapon complete and in very good condition.

Markings:
Receiver: U.S. RIFLE/CAL..30 M1/SPRINGFIELD/ARMORY/3688496.
Bolt: D28287-2SA/RE1.
Barrel: P S-A-6-52.
Mount: 3715854 (side). 3252072.
Stock: S.A./G.A.W. in rectangle. S.A. in rectangle. P in circle.

Weapon transferred to the Museum on 16 February 1964.

Notes: "M1C PRODUCTION RESEARCH TO DATE by Dave McLain and Bob Seijas. Bruce Canfield's excellent article on M1C production (GCA Journal Fall 1999) examines the nagging question of how many M1Cs were produced and when. Dave McLain and I have been working on this problem for over 20 years, since Doug Edwards first passed along the original list of 200 serial numbers compiled by Bob Penny in the mid-60's. Penney had bought a box of discarded M1C bases in surplus sale, and had the foresight to make a list of the rifle serial numbers stamped on them. I added to this list until Dave volunteered to take over the task in the mid-80's, using his newly developed computer prowess. His aggressive pursuit of serial numbers has expanded the list to more than 3000 numbers to date, and we both keep master lists.
Periodically over the years we have analyzed, speculated, re-ordered, surmised, and just plain brainstormed the question. Initially, we started in the certainty of the total number - after all, government records were clear and specific that 7,971 M1C's had been built. We saw our task then as simply finding out what their serial numbers were, an effort we assumed would be a straightforward job of finding enough numbers to identify the serial blocks we know resulted from the production method. For those unfamiliar with the process, a brief flashback to 1944 will get us all on the same page.
The M1's unique top loading feature presented a problem in constructing a sniper version of the standard infantry rifle. Unlike previous standard arms, a telescope could not simply be bolted to the top, and elaborate designs were tried (including an elbow telescope) with unsatisfactory results. The problem was eventually solved by Griffin & Howe with their patented sliding dovetail mount and an offset scope, and a contract was awarded to them. Springfield Armory would select finished but unhardened receivers and send them to G&H in New York. G&H would then drill the five mounting holes in the receiver, thread the three screw holes, mount the dovetail, number the base to the rifle, and return them to Springfield. SA then heat treat the assembly and built the rifle, added the scope and mount, targeted the rifle, and stamped the rifle's number on the mount.
The receivers to be sent to G&H were pulled from the normal production line before hardening but after having been stamped with the serial number and SA logo. They were selected in bunches, resulting in clear blocks of M1C's. Standard M1's are found on both sides of these C serial blocks, and clear separations attest to the fact that SA pulled them in distinct periodic amounts.
Unfortunately, the accuracy of these sniper rifles did not meet the standards set for them - in fact, many were less accurate than the standard M1 - and the procedure was modified after several months. One suspected cause at that time was the different response to heat treating between the SA receiver and the attached G&H base, resulting in warpage. An alteration of the assembly process was instituted, in which SA removed the bases and heat treated them separately. Bruce and I have debated this issue several times in the past, as he questioned why SA continued to send receivers to G&H when SA was certainly capable of drilling and tapping the holes itself. Nevertheless, that is what happened. I interviewed people at G&H in the early 1980's when they were still in New York City, anent issue, G&H continued to drill holes until the end of M1C production.
Further delays in the production of C's were caused by difficulty in acquiring telescopes. As Springfield was under constant pressure to deliver rifles, it must have been frustrating to stack otherwise complete C's in the corner, undeliverable for lack of scopes. It can be assumed that SA responded by only pulling and sending receivers when telescopes became available, because the serial blocks become much smaller and farther apart as 1945 goes on. The first blocks are clearly 300 to 500 numbers in size, whereas most later blocks are only 30 to 50 serial numbers long.
In any case, the later 1980's and early 1990's found Dave and me merrily working on our serial lists, getting excited over every new observation and fitting it into our matrix. We had developed a master list of serial blocks and numbered them, estimated their sizes based on observations, assigned a 'reliability' factor to each, and listed other pertinent factors, like the closest standard M1 on each end, whether there were any standard M1 observations within the supposed block, how far it was to the next M1C block, etc. Data on a typical M1C serial block looks like:
BLOCK 21
LOW M1C SERIAL: 3453487 CLOSEST M1 SERIAL: 3453421
HIGH M1C SERIAL: 3453586 CLOSEST M1 SERIAL: 3453596
RANGE: 100
OBSERVATIONS: 20
GAP IN OBSERVATIONS: 18 (largest spread between M1C observations)
RELIABILITY FACTOR: 20 (range of observations divided by number of observations)
ESTIMATED SIZE: 100
GAP TO NEXT BLOCK: 466
M1C'S IN GAP: 0
We make every effort to be conservative in this effort, and do not consider a block as distinct if there is a spread of more than 40 between M1C serial observation. In cases where we suspect that it is all one block, but this gap in observations is wider than our arbitrary 40, we break the block at that point and list it as, say, 7A and 7B. It's a real event when an observation turns up that unites two lettered blocks into one!
We are also conservative in estimating the probable size of the block, although we have a predilection for even numbers or those ending is 5, simply because it seems logical that SA would pull an easily recognizable number like 100 or 125. To date we have identified more than 135 distinct M1C serial blocks, ranging in size from the mammoth Block 27 at 1000 to the tiny 33D with 10. And it is noteworthy that you can count on one hand and have fingers left over the times we have been surprised by a new number in the last 10 years. At this point, 99% of all new observations fall neatly into our block matrix.
But back to 1990 or 91...as we began to receive a flood of new M1C serials from rifles, bases and mounts, our groups got better and better, reliability went up, lettered groups got melded into whole blocks. And a disturbing fact that had been nagging at us became too evident to ignore. Dave was the first to acknowledge it, saying, 'Bob, I think they made more than they said.' Bob replied, 'I think your right.' No matter how conservatively we estimated block size, it was obvious we were way over the 7971 total stated in government records.
Both Dave and I had been aware of the 1951 document cited in Bruce Canfield's article calling for the construction of over 3000 new M1C's since Billy Pyle had sent it to me a year or two before. My initial reaction to the memo was skepticism and then outright doubt. It didn't make any sense that SA was being ordered to construct new M1C's at almost the same time as they were salvaging existing M1C's down to issue grade by plugging the holes. Earlier interviews with former SA personnel on other subjects had revealed that morale at the Armory was very low around that time, owing at least in part to conflicting orders that changed frequently. Production orders were issued and then canceled within weeks, worOur growing implied totals, however, made us desperate to find a larger population, and forced us to reconsider the 1951 order. If many more than 8,000 drilled receivers were not there, they had to come from somewhere! Yet, we have found no reliable or verifiable exampled or reports of M1C's outside our original matrix in the 3,200,000 to 3,800,000 serial range, other than about a dozen in the 2.8 to 3.2 million range that we had long assumed to be M1E8 prototypes (4 are at SANHS and one is at The Royal Small Arms Factory in England), and 5 or 6 unverifiable very old reports that we had labeled 'depot rifles' but may have been erroneous reporting. If more than 3000 had been constructed from older WWII standard rifles, there would certainly be evidence on the ground by this time. Statistically, we should have seen nearly 6000 by now.
The result was that we welcomed the addition of the 1951 rifles, but based on our observations we simply could not accept the contention that these rifles were not in the classic M1C serial range. Bruce and I had several mail debates on the issue, but each of us held to our original convictions. Dave and I, however, remain confident that for practical purposes all M1C's fall into the serial range of our original matrix.
So how do we explain the fact that the order mandates that the 3,087 M1C's or 1951 be drawn 'from field stores' and yet fall into the original M1C serial range? Because they were already built as M1C's or were drilled receivers in Manufacturing Stores, and were simply drawn out.
The original contracts for the M1C specified that 21,000 rifles were to be built, and the monthly production quotas for the January - June, 1945 period totaled 11,100. We can assume that the other 9,900 were scheduled for the second half of calendar 1945. The abrupt end of the war, however, resulted in the immediate cancellation of most weapons contracts before their completion.
Armory records for the first half of the 1946 fiscal year beginning in July of 1945 contain the following remarks:
'The production picture at the Armory was constantly changing during this period....Many components, finished or in progress were scrapped or turned in to Manufacturing Stores as a result of cancellation of orders immediately after VJ-Day. Consequently, a great deal of work actually done in the Armory shops is not reflected in the production figures for the period, which include only completed items delivered to Field Service stores. Major items completed during this period included the following:
ITEM NEW MANUFACTURE QUANTITY
U.S. Rifle, Caliber .30, M1C 3000
U.S. Rifle, Caliber .30, M1 9556
Barrel, Caliber .50 Machine Gun, M3 1415
The recorded total of 7,971 M1C's, then, was composed of the following actually delivered rifles:
Delivered in 1st half of Fiscal 1945 (July 1944 - December 1944) 11
Delivered in 2nd half of Fiscal 1945 (January 1945 - June 1945) 4960.
Delivered in 1st half of Fiscal 1945 (July 1945 - December 1945) 3000
Total
7971
However, when many contractors complained of the financial hardship these cancellations represented, the government relented and allowed completion and delivery of items already under construction or in progress. We are unable to discover a record of how many drilled receivers this might have represented, but it is probably substantial because of the cumbersome process of sending them from Massachusetts to New York and back again. During regular wartime production, barrel dates of M1C's vs. standard M1's indicate this delay was almost three months door to door at SA. We can also assume that G&H scraped up every receiver it had and drilled holes in them to qualify as 'in progress.'
Since the Hiroshima and Nagasaki A-Bombs were dropped in August, and V-J Day was early September, the negotiation that allowed completion of work in pThere is further support in the 1951 order for our contention that the 3087 C's stipulated were already built as M1C's. While the order mandates construction of 14,325 M1D's and allots funds to purchase 14,325 M84 telescopes for them, there is no allocation for telescopes of any kind for the M1C's. The logical assumption is that these scopes already existed. And anybody who has tried to use an M84 on an M1C knows they simply don't fit - the eyepiece interferes with the sight knob unless the rubber eyeshade is discarded, making sighting in bright light difficult.
The bottom line for Dave McClain and Bob Seijas continues to be our confidence in being able to verify an M1C to something like 97% accuracy by fitting it into our matrix. This owes to our findings that the number of M1C serials outside our matrix. This owes to our findings that the number of M1C serials outside our matrix is statistically insignificant and trivial in absolute terms. If they were out there, we would have been some. The insignificant number that fall outside our matrix, like the old unverified 'depot guns' could be simple mistakes in reporting. One misread digit or reporting an M1D for an M1C by a novice or non-collector are common. Some have been verified as outright fakes.
Thus, a collector who wants to take a chance on an M1C that looks good but doesn't square with the matrix should feel free to do so, just as he is free to bet $3000 on a 40 to 1 longshot at the race track.
At present, nobody knows exactly how many drilled receivers and completed M1C's were made - but we're workin' on it! And we'll eventually know the serial blocks, too. When we do we'll publish them." - Garand Collector Association Journal, Winter 1999.

"M1C RESEARCH AND UPDATE by Dave McLain & Bob Seijas. An opportunity to further M1C research was provided by a recent research trip to CMP's Anniston Headquarters to examine a small lot of M1Cs included among the rifles returned from Greece. Collectors have several areas of contention regarding the evolution of staked and non-staked screw holes on receivers, along with the use and purpose of the SA-52 rebuild mark. It is also noteworthy that there were no rifles with the SA-52 rebuild mark among the Greek returned M1Cs. Many of these rifles had various barrel dated that were post 1953, including SA, HRA, and LMR. None of these rifles had scopes or mounts. Some of the receivers had no bases, but the lack of finish where the base was mounted is evidence that previously installed brackets (bases)* were originally Parkerized as an assembled unit.
Among the M1Cs returned from Greece were original Griffin and Howe assemblies with base serials marked on the bottom and heavily staked on the inside at the threaded screw holes. Brackets numbered on the bottom were originally done at Griffin & Howe during World War II and are typical of normal WWII production. During the latter stages of WWII, Ordnance reportedly issued a memo to G&H to cease numbering brackets to the receiver. Some of the inspected Anniston M1Cs had unmarked brackets while a number of others had brackets numbered on the side. Brackets numbered on the side indicate another M1C assembly program, probably for the Korean War by Springfield Armory. There is a distinct difference in number style between Griffin & Howe's stamping and those numbered by Springfield. The most noticeable is the flat-top number 3 used by Griffin & Howe and the round top 3 used by Springfield Armory.
It has long been suspected that bracketAll the rifles examined with brackets numbered on the side had SA dated 1951 barrels. Most of these side-numbered brackets matched the serial number of the receiver. There is an Ordnance memo ordering a 'new' quantity of 3,087 M1Cs to be built in 1951. This evidence reinforces that these are the 'new' M1Cs Ordnance refers to as built in 1951 for Korea, built on previously contracted M1 receivers modified by Griffin & Howe. These receivers were retrieved from manufacturing stores at SA from WWII production or were from post-WW2 overhauled M1Cs. Evidence also indicates the possibility that the new M1Cs assembled for Korea were done in two distinct groups using early and late dated 1951 SA barrels. There are no unique serial number blocks involved, they come from ordinary WWII M1C production receivers. None of the returned Greek Anniston rifles has the SA-52 rebuild mark.
There were a few side-marked brackets among the CMP rifles that did not match the receiver serial number. These rifles could have been overhauled or rebuilt post-1951 at any time. Rifles like this are occasionaly seen today in the public collector's market.
Many of the newly assembled M1C receivers showed no evidence whatsoever of stake marks on the receiver surrounding the screw holes, and some only showed faint evidence of attempting to stake the screw themselves. Most had matching base numbers stamped on the side. The conclusion is that the 'new' production of M1Cs for Korea used receivers that were previously finished and hardened, making any attempts to effectively stake the receiver futile.
It would also be safe to assume that this small production run of M1Cs built in 1951 was no more than an interim contingency plan for sniper rifles until the M1Ds could be produced and assembled in sufficient quantity. The Ordnance memo calling for their construction also ordered the manufacture of nearly 15,000 M1D rifles on an emergency basis. After this was established, the overwhelming quantity of unneeded and previously drilled WWII M1C receivers were plugged and marked SA-52, converting them back to ordinary, standard issue rifles.
The appearance or lack of stake marks does not define whether a receiver was ever an M1C. This is simply an erroneous assumption, and the rifles observed at Anniston confirm this. These observations, combined with other evidence gathered over many years, makes it very difficult to contend that the lack of a staking means a receiver were never fully assembled M1C or had a bracket installed. There is simply no way to tell if a receiver was ever assembled as an M1C if it lacks stake marks on the inside bracket screw holes.
It would, however, be a valid assumption to believe that receivers were staked for most of WWII production, and that un-staked M1C receivers were very late WWII production and of the Korean War vintage 'new' M1C assembly/production group.
The evidence gathers to date is clear and overwhelming, so much so that it can be clearly stated that former M1C receivers marked SA-52 were plugged. With the adoption and production of the M1D, there were no longer needed, whereas standard M1 rifles were still very much in demand. Any M1C rifle with a SA-52 rebuild mark has been restored from a plugged receiver including any represented as the Marine Corps version designated MC1952 MC-1. Further, none of the documented and valid MC1952 USMC sniper rifles released by Quantico Marine Corps Museum some years ago bears an SA-52 rebuild mark and none in recent USMC inventory bears the SA-52 rebuild mark either.
Not a single M1C serial number was surprising or unexpected (actual receivers as well as numbered bases) from this smA summary of conclusions based on the data available.
1. M1C receivers with the SA-52 rebuild mark were originally plugged after this overhaul.
2. Brackets numbered on the bottom edge are Griffin & Howe specific and pre-Korean War.
3. Brackets numbered on the side with the distinctive Springfield Armory numbers are the 'new' M1C production intended for the Korean War as stipulated by the Ordnance memo dated 1951. Originally they will display an SA barrel dated 1951.
4. There is an indication from barrel dates that the 'new' M1C production of 1951 occurred at two different intervals: early and late in 1951.
5. The lack of any internal staking of the receivers around screw holes does not and cannot imply the receiver was never assembled as a completed M1C.
The opportunity provided by the CMP to view these rifles was much appreciated. The information gained substantially reinforced previously obtained data and theories on the M1Cs. Thank you Orest and your Anniston CMP staff.
*The technically correct term for the part screwed and pinned to M1C receivers to accept the scope and mount assembly is 'bracket.' Most collectors call it the 'base.'"

"Springfield Armory production only. Serial number range is between 3,200,000 and 3,800,000. This variant is very rare with only 7,900 produced. Should be mounted with M81, M82 or M84 scope with 7/8" scope rings." - Schwing

"CURTAILMENT OF PRODUCTION. Effect of V-J Day. When Japan surrendered to the Allied Powers on 2 September 1945, the event was to inaugurate a period of change and uncertainty in Springfield Armory's production activities. The direct impact of V-J Day was cushioned somewhat by the curtailment of large-scale production of the U.S. Rifle, Cal..30, M1 which had been taking place since V-E Day. In the four months preceding final victory sharp decreases were made in the order for rifles, and the Armory was undertaking the problems and drawing up plans for the change-over to jobbing lots of small arms weapons. These plans were abandoned, however, with V-J Day, inasmuch as all orders were cancelled and only remanufacturing orders were reinstated. The cancellation of major items included 94,226 M1 Rifles, 13,187 M1C Rifles, 100,000 T20E2 Rifles, an experimental type, and other items such as the Browning Automatic Rifle, the M1 Carbine, and the modification of the Cal..50 Browning...." - Army Summary

"MYTH: 'M1C mount and rings.'
FACT: The term M1C mount as used by the U.S. Army in inclusive. All parts necessary for attaching a telescope are provided for under the term 'M1C Scope Mount Assembly.' Whereas 'rings' is a common term for use on civilian telescopic firearms, it is not technically correct for use on the M1C Mount. What would normally be referred to as 'rings' is replaced by 'supports' and 'clamps'.
MYTH: The 'SA-52' marking found on Springfield Armory receivers is a characteristic only of rebuilt M1C rifles.
FACT: The 'SA-52' receiver marking is a characteristic of any M1 Rifles that went through a rebuild at Springfield Armory in Fiscal Year (FY) 52 (July 1, 1951 through June 30, 1952). It has been observed on non sniper variants as well as Winchester receivers. SA did not use rebuild marks on M1 receivers again until the early 1960's." - THE GARAND STAND REPORT, Summer, 2004.

References:
Gilbert, Adrian. SNIPER. St. Martin's Paperbacks. N.Y., N.Y. 1994.
Schwing, Ned. STANDARD CATALOG OF MILITARY FIREARMS. Krause Publications. Iola, Wi. 2001.